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1.  Introduction 
The share of renewable energies in the electricity sector (‘green’ electricity production) 
relative to overall electricity supply has been growing steadily over the last years in most 
industrialized countries. This expansion was due to economic support either by subsidies or 
quota requirements for green energy. Without such support, green electricity would not be 
competitive to electricity supply from conventional production capacities (“black” electricity 
production) – e.g. coal and gas fired or nuclear power plants. In this paper, we study the 
effects of the two most prominent forms of economic support: surcharge-financed guaranteed 
Feed-in Tariffs (sfgFIT) that are most common in European, and proportional quotas which 
are implemented in several U.S. American jurisdictions.  
Under the sfgFIT system, electricity from renewable sources is guaranteed a minimum price 
(Feed-in Tariff) which is financed by a constant surcharge on the market price of all 
electricity sold to consumers of electricity. Priority for green electricity in grid access ensures 
the regulation’s effectiveness. Under the proportional quota system, producers of black 
electricity have to ensure that the production of black energy is matched by the production of 
green energy in a fixed ratio. Enforcement is usually secured by a system in which black 
energy producers have to buy a corresponding number of tradable certificates of green energy 
production.  
In analyzing the price effects of both the sfgFIT and the proportional quota system, the 
interaction of two countervailing effects needs to be considered. The first one is the pass-
through of the constant surcharge and the costs of the certificates, respectively. The second is 
the ‘Merit Order’ effect, which describes the reduction in marginal costs of black energy 
production when green energy crowds out the most expensive sources of black energy. As we 
will show, the relative strength of the two effects not only depends on the type of economic 
support for green energy, but also on the structure of the market for black energy described by   2
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index. We neglect emission trading in our model not to obfuscate 
the interaction of market concentration and the price effects green energy promotion. 
Existing publications on the effects of economic support for renewable energies either focus 
on other market-based instruments than sfgFIT or neglect the relevance of the market 
structure. Fischer & Newell (2008) and Fischer (2010), who start from the insight that all 
market-based promotion policies can be expressed by a combination of taxes and subsidies, 
focus on promotion strategies as they are applied on US-American markets. They find that for 
Bertrand-structured competitive markets the price effects of such policies depends on relative 
size of marginal costs of green and black electricity production, a result which also follows 
from our model (Section 6). Drawing on the same framework, Fischer & Peronas (2010) 
stress that different instruments in action need to be coordinated. In a Cournot oligopoly 
model, Tamás et al. (2010) compare the proportional quota system to Feed-in Premiums 
financed from general taxes as the Danish law provides for. It is obvious, that such a per-unit 
subsidy can only lead to declining retail prices. 
Empirical studies of the effect of sfgFIT and quota systems are ambiguous and neglect the 
interaction with market concentration which is at the center of our argument. Traber & 
Kemfert (2009) see a positive effect of the German sfgFIT on the domestic electricity price, 
but a consequential reduction of prices of emission permits both in Germany and abroad. 
Frondel et al. (2009) and Lechtenböhmer & Samadi (2010) derive similar results. Rathmann 
(2007) and Sensfuß & Ragwitz (2007) show that the reverse may be true for certain 
parameters. Sensfuß & Ragwitz (2007) argue, however, that the merit order effect fails to 
decrease consumer prices when market power of black energy producers is large, a claim 
which we show to contradict microeconomic theory. 
In the following section, we develop a model of a market with black and green electricity in 
which green electricity is supported by an sfgFIT. The following four sections study the 
effects of the sfgFIT on retail prices of electricity for different market structures. Section 7 
compares the effects of sfgFIT to support by a proportional quota system. Section 8 
concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
We consider a wholesale and a retail market. On the wholesale market supply is given by 
production. Production of electricity may stem from black (b) or from green (g) sources. Let   3
there be n  producers of black electricity with production costs    ii cb with strictly positive 
first and second derivatives    0 ii cb    and    0 ii cb    for all    1,2,..., in  . Overall 




  . Green electricity is produced by a large number of 
small producers with minimal marginal costs of aggregate production given by   kg   where 
    00 i kci    and   0 kg   . In slight abuse of notation, we write   gk   as the inverse 
of   kg  . 
Demand on the wholesale market is given by the amount of energy purchased by competitive 
retailers at the wholesale market price w p . For simplicity of the model, retailers incur no costs 
from trade, transportation or the like, but sell electricity on the retail market at the price they 
pay on the wholesale market plus the surcharge   they possibly have to pay to finance the 
guaranteed FIT for green electricity. Hence the retail price  r p  is equal to  w p   . Total 
surcharges cover the difference between the guaranteed FIT  o p  and the wholesale price for all 
green electricity produced:     max 0, ow bg p pg    . Finally, demand on the retail 
market is given by an inverse demand function for electricity   
d
r pe  with a negative first 
derivative  
d
r pe  . Black and green electricity are perfect substitutes: ebg   . Both markets 
are in equilibrium when   
d
wr r pp p e    , which after inserting   implies: 
       max 0,
dd
wr or p pe p pe g b    (1) 
With respect to the supply of black electricity, we consider four different market structures on 
the wholesale market: perfect competition with an endogenous large number of homogeneous 
producers, Bertrand competition in an oligopoly with a given number of producers, Cournot 
competition in an oligopoly with a given number of producers, and monopoly.  
3.  Perfect competition 
Perfect competition among a large number of homogeneous black energy producers may be 
considered as an extreme case with an unambiguous result. All producers supply at their 
(homogeneous) average cost minimum      ,min min
i
ii i i b cc b b
  . Should the market price be 
higher, more firms enter; should it be lower, firms leave the market. Thus the equilibrium 
market price on the wholesale market is 
P
,min wi pc
  , where the superscript P marks   4
equilibrium values for perfect competition on the wholesale market. For the sake of realism, 
we assume that the average cost minimum of producers of green energy is larger than  ,min i c
  so 
that there is no supply of green electricity without a guaranteed FIT (
P 0 g  ). 
Without a guaranteed FIT and hence no surcharge ( 0 o p    ), market equilibrium is given 
by the prices 
PP
,min wri ppc
   and the equilibrium quantity of black electricity 
p b  is 





  . If government guaranteed a FIT  o p  at or above the minimum 
of average costs of production of green electricity for all quantities of green electricity, the 
amount of supply of green electricity would be undefined, respectively infinite. We therefore 
assume for the perfect competition case that government guarantees a FIT at or above the 
minimum of average costs of production of green electricity only for a given quantity  o g . 
Hence 
P ˆ o gg  , where the hat denotes here and in what follows equilibrium values with the 
sfgFIT. Assuming  
d
or o pp g   equation (1) implies   ,min
d
iw r o cp p b g
     
  
d
or o o p pb g gb   which is equivalent to: 
      
PP P P
,min ,min ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
d
rr o i o o o i pp bg c bp gb g c
       (2) 
where the inequality follows from the fact that the penultimate term is a weighted average of 
,min i c
  and  ,min oi pc
  . We thus get: 
Result 1:  Under perfect competition among an endogenous large number of 
homogeneous black energy producers the introduction of a sfgFIT 
increases the retail price of electricity. 
4.  Monopoly 
Turning to the other extreme, the monopolist supplier of black electricity, allows us to clarify 
the intuition of the following results. Assuming for simplicity that without effective FIT, no 
green energy is supplied on the market (eb  ), the monopolist’s profits are 
        
dd
mr m r m pb bcb pe ece      (3) 
With a guaranteed surcharge-financed FIT, due to equation (1) the monopolist’s profits 
become   5
                ˆ dd d
mr m o r o r m o oo p eb c b p pe gp pee c e gp p gp         . (4) 
The difference between the two expressions for profits is thus a smaller term in the argument 
of the cost function and additional costs which are fixed from the monopolist’s point of view 
(  oo pg p ).  
Taking derivatives of both profit terms yields: 























p ec e g p
db 
 
     

, (6) 





p ed p e
ed e
   is the price elasticity of demand for electricity. Setting 
0 m dd b   yields 
M e  and   
MM d
r p pe  . Inserting 
M e  into equation (6) yields 
    M
MM ˆ 0 mm m o ee dd b c ec e g p

      due to    0 mm cb   . The monopolist will thus 
choose 
M ˆ b  large enough to get   





rr r p ep p e
  . We hence get: 
Result 2: When black electricity is produced by a monopolist the introduction of 
a sfgFIT lowers the retail price of electricity. 
The intuition for this result is that the monopolist’s fixed costs increase, but the marginal costs 
decline as a consequence of the introduction of the FIT. The sfgFIT system is tantamount to 
forcing the monopolist to buy a certain amount of green electricity at a given price and then 
allowing the monopolist to decide on the total quantity of electricity to be sold. Obviously, the 
monopolist’s decision does not depend on the fixed costs he must incur for the green 
electricity, but only on the marginal costs of producing additional electricity. His profits will 
decline when the sfgFIT is introduced or increased.   6
5.  Cournot Competition 
We now turn to the Cournot-oligopoly case. Here, due to equation (1), profits of black-
electricity producers are given by: 
       max 0,
dd i
ir i i i o r
b
peb cb p pe g
b
     (7) 
Optimization without FIT, and thus without any production of green electricity, requires  






ri i i r i i i
ie p
dp e
p eb c b p e s c s e
bd e 
 
          
   (8) 
and with the guaranteed surcharge-financed FIT 
 
     








r dd i i
ri i i o r
i
o i dd
ri i i o o r i
ep i
dp e b gg
pe bc b p pe
bd e b b b
gp
p es c s e g p p p e s
b b 
              







   (9) 
where  i s  is the market share of producer i. The derivatives in equations (8) and (9) differ by 
the argument of the marginal cost terms and by the last term in equations (9), which reflects 
the per-unit surcharge on electricity (      
d
or o p peg p b  )  and the reduction of this 
surcharge resulting from an increase in producer i’s quantity (    
d
io r o sp peg p b  ). 
Solving equations (8) yields equilibrium values for total electricity supply 
O e  and black-
electricity producers’ market shares 
O
i s  in the absence of any effective FIT. Inserting 
O e  into 
the retail market demand function returns the corresponding retail market equilibrium price: 
 
OO d
rr p pe  . We first concentrate on the case of n  symmetric black-electricity producers 
(   i cb c b ib     ). Symmetry implies  1 i sn i    independently of the level of e. 
Inserting 
O e  into equation (9) then yields 









eg p g p en
cc p p e
bn n b n

              
   (10)   7
where both the difference between the marginal cost terms and the surcharge term are strictly 
positive. The latter is more likely to supersede the former, the larger the number n  of 
oligopolists. If it does, we have 
O ˆ 0 ii ee b
     and thus all oligopolists will reduce their 
quantities below    
O
o eg pn  , so that 
OO ˆ ee   and thus    
OO OO ˆˆ
dd
rr rr p pe p pe  . If 
the difference between the marginal cost supersedes the surcharge term, the quantity of 
electricity will increase and the price decrease. 
We get a similar result, when the oligopolists are asymmetric. We compare the sums of the 
derivatives in equations (8) and (9) weighted by the oligopolists market shares: 
      
2





ir i i i i r b i i i
ii i i ie p e p
s p e s sc se p e H sc se
b    
   
              
    (11) 
and  






o d d i
ir b i i i o o r b
ii ie p
gp
sp e H s c s e g p p p e H
bb  
 
          





bi i H s
   is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index of the black-electricity producers. 
Assuming that market shares do not change due to the introduction of the FIT for renewable 
energy we can rewrite the weighted sum of derivatives in equation (12) at the solution 
O e  of  
equation (11) as: 









ii i i i i i o o r b
ii i i ee
gp
s s cs e s cse gp p p e H
bb   

    
    (13) 
Again, both the difference between the marginal cost terms and the surcharge term are strictly 
positive and the entire sum is more likely to be positive the larger the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann-Index of the black-electricity producers. Parallel to the argument for symmetric 
oligopolists, we therefore conclude: 
Result 3: When black electricity is produced by Cournot oligopolists the intro-
duction of a sfgFIT may lower the retail price of electricity. It is more 
likely to do so, the higher the concentration of the black-electricity 
market by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index.   8
6.  Bertrand Competition 
It is a well known result that for homogeneous products such as electricity equilibrium 
behavior of Bertrand competition and perfect competition with a fixed number of price-taking 
producers is the limiting case of Cournot competition with n  and thus  0 b H   (see 
textsbooks like e.g. Gravelle&Rees, 2004: 409). It is then apparent from equations (8) and (9) 
that    
BB d
ri i p ec s ei    and thus   





ii ii o o r
i ee
gp







which is positive, if    o gp b  is small enough and the second derivative of the cost functions 
 i c   are large enough. Hence, under these conditions, we also get a positive effect of the FIT 
system on the overall amount of electricity produced and a negative effect on the retail price. 
Result 4: When black electricity is produced by Bertrand oligopolists or a fixed 
number of price-taking producers, the introduction a sfgFIT may lower 
the retail price of electricity. It will do so, if the marginal costs of 
producing black electricity increase strongly in the relevant range and if 
the amount of green electricity induced by the FIT is small relative to 
the amount of black electricity. 
7.  Comparison of quota- and FIT-based support 
To compare the surcharge-financed guaranteed FIT system to a quota system inducing the 
same amount of green electricity production, we refer to the setup in Fischer (2010) where for 
each unit of black electricity a certain number of certificates proving the production of green 
electricity actually sold on the retail market have to be purchased. This construction of a quota 
system corresponds to the actual legal situation in jurisdictions like California and other 
jurisdiction in the US. The central difference between the FIT system to the quota system is 
that under the former, the price of green electricity is fixed and the amount of production of 
green electricity is endogenous, while under the latter, the production quantity is given by the 
ratio of green to black electricity and the price necessary to allow for this quantity is 
endogenous and given by the marginal costs of producing this quantity.    9
Let  A be the required ratio of green to black electricity. The wholesale price of black 
electricity is then given by: 
               11
dd d d
wr gr r r p pe p peApb A k b A pb A A         (15) 
Inserting this into the profit function of a black-electricity producer yields: 
            11
dd
ir i r i i i p b A b k bA p b A Ab c b         , (16) 
where the tilde denotes the quota system, with 






rr i i i
ie p
b
p e k bA p e A k bA A b c b
bb 
 
          

 (17) 
as first derivative. For comparison with the FIT, let us assume that the quota  A is chosen at 
the level which entails exactly the same amount of green electricity as the FIT system does 
with price  o p . We then have   o kb A p    and thus equation (17) turns into 
    





oo dd i i
ri o r o o i i
ie p
gp gp b
p es p p e g p k g p c b
bb b b 
 
          

.(18) 
Comparing this to the derivative under the FIT system in equation (9), we see that 
   
    
  ˆˆ




spp e g p k g p
bb b b b
   
        

, (19) 
where the inequality follows from the fact that all terms in the brackets are positive. This 
inequality in derivatives implies that all equilibrium quantities of black electricity are smaller 
under the quota system than they are under the FIT system. Only when the perceived market 
share  i s  is zero, i.e. when only price takers compete, the equilibrium quantities are the same 
under both systems (see Schwarz et al. 2008). Intuitively, the sfgFIT and the quota system 
differ in two respects, expressed by the two terms in brackets. The first term expresses that 
under the sfgFIT system, the oligopolist takes into account that more production means a 
lower surcharge for every unit, an effect which fails to exist under the quota system. The 
second term captures the fact that under the quota system, the oligopolist takes into account 
the increasing effect which his additional production has on the marginal cost of production of   10
green electricity (second term in brackets), an effect which does not exist under the sfgFIT 
system.
1 This allows us to state our last: 
Result 5: The quota system induces lower quantities of black electricity and 
higher retail prices than the surcharge-financed guaranteed FIT system 
if the black-electricity market is characterized by a Cournot oligopoly 
or a monopoly. If this market exhibits a Bertrand oligopoly or 
competition among a fixed number of price-taking producers, the two 
systems affect the quantity of electricity consumed and the retail price 
of electricity in the same way. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
This paper develops a theoretical model to highlight the bearing of market structures on retail 
price effects of a sfgFIT induced market entrance from green electricity. Moving from perfect 
competition via Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly to monopoly, we find that retail electricity 
prices are more likely to decline, when market concentration as measured by the HHI (from 
perceived market shares) is larger. In the extreme cases, the price effect is unequivocally 
negative (monopoly) or positive (perfect competition).  
One should note, that this result only holds for a given market structure. When firms leave the 
market, market concentration increases and so do electricity retail prices. When running the 
full gamut from perfect competition to monopoly by increasing the sfgFIT and thus 
successively driving firms out of the market the total price effect will be positive: perfect 
competitors produce at the average cost minimum and the monopolist sells at a price above 
average costs, which have been increased by the additional costs of green energy.  
We also show that in Cournot oligopoly and in monopoly markets, a required proportional 
quota of green energy in electricity production induces larger prices than the sfgFIT system 
with the same induced total amount of green electricity. 
 
                                                 
1 This second difference drives the similar result which Tamás (2010) derives for the comparison of a lump-sum-
tax financed FIT and a quota system in a more restrictive model.   11
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